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Introduction: The Historiographical Divide
In the early nineteenth century four gentlemen met in the house 
of a friend in London. Two of them had returned from India, the 
third had come to solicit their views on sending his son to India 
and the fourth narrated this story. Knowing little about India and 
claiming that whatever little knowledge existed was contradictory, 
the father of the son was advised by one of the India-returned 
gentlemen, who claimed to have had spent twenty-five years in 
India, to “keep your son at home”. He said that those who see In-
dia in a positive way do so because of their little experience. The 
climate of India stood first in his list of condemnation – “in India, 
every gale carries disease on its wings, and leaves bile and debility 
behind it”. The ruins and desolation, that is, the landscape, came 
second; the ruins nonetheless were not the result of human agen-
cy but of nature, of solstitial [sic] rains and equinoctial hurricanes. 
The third obvious link to this setting was the production of a weak 
European body, “a bundle of infirmity; a walking automation; a 
miserable Don Gonzalez Pacheco”. The natives of Hindustan were 
not even deemed worthy enough to be spoken about; their four 
cardinal vices − “lust, lying, avarice, and hypocrisy” – summed it 
all up. The fourth object of his ridicule was English society, which 
he described as divided into two, formal and familiar; the first 
being “all ceremony and silence, the other all levity and noise’” 
If you were fortunate enough to be invited among the formalists, 
he said, after enduring “three hours of melancholy gabble, you at 
least [will] steal out of the room, hungry, drowsy, jaded and grum-
bling, lamenting your hard lot, and execrating the mosquitoes!” 
Hearing this when the father had almost decided to keep his 
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son at home, another gentleman, who had spent twenty-three 
years in India, intervened to say something against the “poeti-
cal imagination of his friend”. In his own words, he could not re-
main silent hearing India  satirized and abused. On leaving India, 
whose “air is salubrious, the soil fruitful, and the inhabitants wide 
and benevolent”, he claimed no one can miss the sentiment of 
regret. The purpose of this characterisation, he made it clear, was 
not to create an image of wonder but to lessen the prejudice. He 
challenged the view that Indian nature caused debility; he rather 
blamed the intemperance and idleness of individuals for this. He 
concluded by condemning the home climate as “pernicious” and 
the home society where he was insulted and harassed in every 
street and where he scarcely returned from a public place without 
being pickpocketed (The contrast, or opinions on India 1816).
Few themes in modern Indian historiography have generated so fruitful 
(and at times acrimonious) a discussion as the eighteenth century 
‘change and continuity’. The core of this debate, as far as the British rule 
in India (for the period 1760s-1850s) was concerned, revolves round a 
set of simple questions: did the British rule in India unleash a disruptive 
force that subdued its economy and inferiorised its political culture? 
Was the rule a direct imposition of western notions of sovereignty and 
governance or was it representative of an ongoing socio-economic 
change in South Asia? In other words, as succinctly put by Eric Stokes 
(1973) decades ago, did the rule symbolise ‘revolution’ (sudden radical 
departure) or ‘evolution‘. The answer, however, is not so simple – as 
the writings of historians working on this period have revealed. In many 
ways the story presented above animates the long historiographical 
debate that has taken place on the nature of colonial rule in India. 
While the historians remain divided on the exact nature of colonial rule 
and the varying degrees of change and continuity, the contemporary 
actors were also opposed in their characterisation of what they meant 
by India and being in India. Hostile and sympathetic views existed 
amongst people of the same generation.In the recent past, notably in 
the 1980s, there was a series of seminal interventions that remoulded 
our understanding of the nature of colonial rule in India. The literature 
is too vast to be individually included here and there are, however, good 
reviews of this new ‘historiographical turn’.1 In brief, it can be said that 
the dominant existing view – that showcased the nationalist and Marxist 
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concerns of political economy, colonization, dependency and, not least, 
racial violence imputing that colonialism, right from its early days in 
the 1760s, signalled a period of decline, depravity and inferiority came 
under serious revision. At least, for those aspects that dealt with political 
economy, trade and commerce, culture of governance and production 
of knowledge. It is worth noting that this new intervention, as it widely 
came to be labelled as ‘revisionist historiography’, acquired a status 
of mainstream framework for understanding early colonial rule. As a 
result, a number of regional studies emerged that closely documented 
and analysed the nature of interaction between colonial and ‘indigenous’ 
ideologies of rule, between European and native merchants, the role 
of market and organisation of trade, and so on (Chatterjee 1996; 
Subramanian 1987; Datta 2000). The theme of knowledge production 
was seemingly a later addition; the initial focus was on the nexus 
between political power and trade: on the growth of insidious power of 
an intermediary merchant class that increasingly came to influence the 
political processes during the period between the 1720s and 1780s (a 
rough periodisation). The group was called the ‘portfolio capitalists’ and 
the process the ‘commercialisation of royal power’ (Subrahmanyam and 
Bayly 1988). 
The 1980s was also a period that witnessed the development of an-
other strand of historiographical take on this period. Edward Said’s Ori-
entalism (Said 1978) was enthusiastically received by a host of schol-
ars, and its theoretical insights were deployed to go beyond the realm 
of the socio-economic ‘materialist’ explorations into the understanding 
of ideological and discursive strategies of colonial rule. A major sec-
tion of the practitioners of this strand of scholarly pursuit coalesced 
around the ‘Subaltern Studies’ group. One must point out that this was 
itself regarded as a ‘cultural turn’ within the Subaltern Studies, and 
therefore it would be unfair to characterize the nature of the Subal-
tern Studies as the one closely tied to the ‘postcolonial moods’ right 
from the beginning. After this turn, however, the main thrust was to 
understand how the idea of Otherness was textually constructed in the 
logic of ‘rule of difference’. The colonial imagination on the one hand to 
discover, demarcate and differentiate and on the other to order, catego-
rize, catalogue and regulate meant that colonial discursive strategies 
wielded profound power that fundamentally reshaped the colonial iden-
tity and society. The ‘non-amenable’ and ‘irreconcilable’ position, as Wil-
liam Pinch identifies between these two strands, is however puzzlingly 
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played out broadly on two different turfs of historical timeline (Pinch 
1999). While the ‘early modern group’ in Pinch’s words (by which he 
means the practitioners of revisionist historiography) focused primarily 
on the period of the eighteenth century, historians and anthropologists 
akin to ‘late subaltern/postmodernist’ moods wrote, with very rare and 
seminal exceptions (Guha 1963; Cohn 1985), wrote largely on the post 
mid-nineteenth century period. While the earlier group focused on the 
nature of the state formation in the eighteenth century – first amongst 
post-Mughal regional successor-states and later the colonial-Company 
state – the latter group concentrated on the theme of domination and 
subordination of marginal groups and the ways to retrieve their voices 
from hegemonic colonial discourses. 
In spite of this slight uneven ground of temporality, the debates 
on the eighteenth-century transition remain highly polarized. For those 
who see the English East India Company’s rule as a force of disruption, 
the period was characterised by decline and increasing deprivation of 
the local population in the field of economy, and with the imposition of 
new forms of sovereignty and governance in the field of polity. These 
forms of governance as represented by ‘ethics’ of codification of law and 
texts marked a fundamental change in the ways the pre-colonial shared 
and plural forms of sovereignty were devised and practised. Arguably, 
the rationalist, modernist, unitary and bureaucratic notions of sover-
eignty and governance were imposed on the colonial society without 
any mediation and adaptation. The contractualization of power driven 
by the force of ‘rationalist codification’ was a part of colonial project, and 
apparently well-thought of and successfully implemented, that came 
into force right from the inception of the colonial rule in India. This is a 
broad summary extracted from a number of works and therefore it does 
inflict the violence of generalisation. However, the implication of these 
core ideas have proved wide-reaching as has been shown in a number 
of scholarly works in different fields of historical investigation, such as 
the issue of the economic effects of colonial rule, the culture of violence 
and racism, the ideology of governance, the cartographic mapping of 
the empire and not least the travelling gaze of the Europeans. In each 
of these cases, with or without any adherence to ambivalent practices 
of colonial rule, there is a certain degree of emphasis on the processes 
of objectification (of landscape and proprietorial relationships, for in-
stance), codification (of texts and laws), and standardization (through 
insistence on caste and religion that envisaged that these were the 
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‘pure’ categories revealing the true social order of the colonial society) 
that were initiated by the colonial rule, or more aptly, are told to be the 
specific products of colonial state formation. 
What is significant in this historiographical divide is that the tem-
poral location of colonialism itself has become highly contested. When 
did colonialism start in India? Is colonialism to be understood as a set 
of institutions and practices with a recognizable and specific form of 
governance (either imposed or evolved) or as a set of representations 
along cultural values that worked in a connected and continued fash-
ion from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? Most scholars would 
tend to broadly agree with the former position; however, the flourish-
ing field of ‘colonial discourse analysis’ – a shorthand which is often 
(albeit sometimes inadequately) used to describe the second ‘turn’ of 
the 1980s, – has led some scholars, with a mandatory disclaimer of 
professing no teleology, to argue that seventeenth century travelogues, 
for instance, do lay down the foundation for or provide the background 
to the imperial world (Singh 1996: 19-47). The forceful argument made 
by Bernard Cohn to pay critical and close attention to cultural forms of 
colonial domination, what he called the ‘investigative modalities’ of co-
lonial rule that included themes such as textual translation, observation 
and travel, and enumerative ordering techniques such as census and 
museum, can hardly be held directly responsible for promoting this line 
of approach. Nevertheless, by highlighting the inventive power of colo-
nial words, Cohn’s works do provide a theoretical basis for scholars who 
wish to see the ‘invented’ India as a site of alterity and otherness vis-
à-vis a European hierarchy of difference to trace the ‘incipient colonial 
ideology’ in the seventeenth-century European literature on India. The 
dichotomous framework (for instance, Christian/heathen, civilised/bar-
baric, law/custom, words/commands and not least, object/substance) 
as seen in the travel and ethnographic literature from the seventeenth 
century arguably established the European rhetorical and imaginative 
dominance that set the stage for the British Empire in India (ibid.). 
In contrast to Singh’s thesis (and also Cohn’s), Pinch in his reading of 
the early seventeenth-century encounter between Mughal emperor Ja-
hangir and the British ambassador to India, Thomas Roe, challenges the 
rigidity of the claim that Europeans only lived in the world of ‘signs and 
correspondences’, in which the price of an object overrode the symbolic 
and cultural value (substance) of it. In spite of the differences between 
Europeans and Indians, Pinch argues, there remained the possibility in 
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which the ‘cognitive world of each dissolved into the other’ (Pinch 1999: 
405). In his essay Pinch focuses on the seventeenth century; other 
scholars from within the field of ‘discourse analysis’ have questioned the 
polarity and bifocalism of this ‘colonial encounter’ for the subsequent 
period. It has been argued that the relationship between the coloniser 
and colonised was ‘not explicable in terms of an allegory of otherness’ 
(Suleri 1992: 3). 
If one stretches this point a bit further, we can notice how power-
ful the dichotomies of ‘hate’ and ‘sympathy’ still are – as encapsulated 
in the opening story – in the way the debates on this period continue. 
When David Arnold – self-admittedly following Cohn – (Arnold 2005: 4) 
argued that the Indian landscape was systematically brought under the 
gaze and control of European eyes leading to codification of spaces and 
dispossession of native peoples, Vinita Damodaran, in her review of his 
work, reminded the reader that ‘Far from being proponents of an all-
embracing Orientalist prejudices, Europeans (until the mid-nineteenth 
century) frequently approached Asia, Africa and the Americas in many 
different ways, described the new world in minutest detail and often 
with sympathy.’ (Damodaran 2007: 711) Gordon Stewart’s stimulating 
account of George Bogle’s journey into Tibet in the late eighteenth cen-
tury brings out the multifaceted role of travel in the age of the Enlight-
enment and empire. First, travel created conditions for meeting points 
of different enlightenments, second, it was a means of acquiring reputa-
tion and manliness, to ‘jolt out some of the arrogant principles’ (Stewart 
2009: 29); and third, and most importantly, it was ‘not only the medium 
to re-enact cultural differences […] but on the contrary, to transcend the 
boundaries’ (Ibid.: 49). 
However, within this historiographical divide, there is seemingly a 
big grey zone of overlap, which unwittingly goes unrecognised in the 
way that arguments are read and presented. For instance, very few 
scholars would deny that Orientalism and Orientalist projects, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, abetted colonialism (N. Dirks in summaris-
ing Cohn’s approach, Dirks 2004) but also there would be very few of 
them who would deny the active role of native participation (out of fear, 
greed or coercion) in the formation of colonial knowledge or the claim 
that colonial discourses on Indian landscape and culture were ridden 
with contradictions. There are also elements of change and shifts within 
scholarly writings that must be accounted for, or at least the way these 
writings engaged with. Pinch points out an interesting fact that C.A. 
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Bayly had singled out one of Cohn’s early essays on structural change 
and continuity as a “major theoretical springboard for his own argu-
ments of long-term continuities in Indian society history independent 
of colonial policies” (Pinch 1999: 395). However, Cohn’s later emphasis 
on bringing out “the distorting influence of colonial history and western 
scientific categories” on the one hand and “the active and dynamic basis 
of Indian tradition” on the other, somehow for historians such as Bayly 
did not resonate with their understanding of colonial power and knowl-
edge – although Bayly accepted the fact that by the 1820s colonialism 
led to the creation of useful knowledge (in turn leading to a decline 
of affective knowledge of pre-colonial polities). Instead, Bayly, argued 
that, first, the colonial stereotypes were reflections of weakness rather 
than a gauge of hegemony; and second, these stereotypes emerged in 
the “zone of ignorance” (Bayly 1996).
And similarly, as Seema Alavi has shown in her crisp introduction to 
The Eighteenth Century in India (Alavi, 2007), the revisionist position is 
also not homogenous. On the issue of the resilience of the indigenous 
political economies in south India, she shows the differences existing 
between the views of Burton Stein and D. Washbrook (Alavi 2007). 
Bayly’s earlier position largely treated the East India Company as one 
of the ‘Indian states’ on two accounts: one, the Company was forced 
to play like an ‘Indian’ player in the game of power struggle during the 
time of regional assertions by relying on indigenous capital and inter-
mediary groups; and second, the Company, once it was able to succeed 
over other players, crafted its rule on the existing military-fiscal system 
(Bayly 1994). Alavi refers to a body of work that came out in the 1990s, 
which in her words, ‘reinforced the revisionist position’ but they also 
complicated the above arguments (Alavi 2002: 35). This new body of 
work ‘implicitly suggests that the critical changes  that Bayly located in 
the 1830s “age of reforms” prefigured in the eighteenth century itself’ 
(ibid.). In the light of these new interventions in the 1990s, Bayly him-
self has revised and, more importantly, clearly outlined his understand-
ing of the nature of the early colonial state (Bayly 1994). The emphasis 
in this latter essay is on both aspects: the nature of the colonial state 
formation (a theme that was central to his earlier writings) and the 
nature of the colonial state. Bayly summarizes the debate and the di-
vide by referring to the works of Burton Stein, Frank Perlin and Andre 
Wink (interestingly labelling them as adopting an ‘oriental’ approach) 
who, according to him, argued that the British in India were successful 
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because they managed to build their state machinery upon the existing 
system of revenue extraction and military tradition, in short, the mili-
tary fiscalism of the Mughal rulers. 
In Bayly’s earlier writings, particularly in Rulers, Townsmen and Ba-
zaars, his own position was very similar (Bayly 1983), although he does 
not put himself under the label of ‘orientals’. However, in the essay 
under discussion, so far as the nature of colonial/Company state is con-
cerned, Bayly clearly admits that the ‘Company’s regime was evidently 
something more than a white Mughal Empire’ (Bayly 1994: 324).
We will return to some of these points in the following section but 
one of the results of the coming together of these two ‘turns’, together 
with a body of literature that lies in the overlapping zone of ‘continuity 
and change’, is the extreme richness and diversification of research 
themes: from classical topics of revenue and administrative history to 
the production of knowledge, and from the nature of British society 
in India to that of forms of colonial aesthetics, mapping picturesque 
representations and the imperial travelling gaze. 
However, diversification is not the only virtue of this body of schol-
arship. The eighteenth-century debate has also remained fortunate 
in creating intense debate and exchange on topics that attracted 
scholars’ attention two or three generations ago. Revisiting the older 
scholarship has resulted in a formidable and vast body of research, 
as identified by Douglas E. Haynes and Ian J. Barrow in their stock-
taking introduction to a special volume on the eighteenth-century In-
dia (Barrow & Haynes 2004). Many arguments, as Haynes and Barrow 
rightly point out, run contradictory to each other; some remain un-
clear in their implications about coming closer to forming any coher-
ent articulation on the period. Recent years have seen some valuable 
contributions that have tried to synthesise these arguments, including 
the one referred above. However, writing in 2004, Haynes and Barrow 
state that the form and character of colonialism between 1780 and 
1840 still remain quite unclear although some of the concerns related 
to the nature of colonial transition were attracting a new generation 
of historians (ibid.). 
The purpose of this review, however, is not to give any better and 
coherent overview of the period but to take into account some of the 
new writings on the period. The idea is to tease out the main argu-
ments of the recent interventions on the transition debate and put 
these in dialogue with some of the core arguments presented in the 
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earlier body of work. In terms of readership, this essay is directed 
more towards the undergraduate and graduate students of South 
Asian history who might feel overwhelmed (I for one surely did) by a 
number of overlapping and conflicting arguments on this theme rath-
er than towards proposing any programmatic approach in the field of 
eighteenth century research.
The two Transitions of the Eighteenth Century
Seema Alavi in her introduction to The Eighteenth Century in India draws 
attention to two transitions that characterized the period. One is the tran-
sition from the Mughal state to regional successor states (Awadh, Bengal, 
Hyderabad being the most prominent) in the first half of the eighteenth 
century; the other is the rise of the English East India Company as a sort 
of Company/colonial state in the late eighteenth century (Alavi 2007). 
In a recent article, Jon. E Wilson claims that these two transitions are 
‘two very different sets of arguments’ (Wilson 2007: 954). Wilson’s own 
intervention is definitely one of the most challenging in recent years and 
this review will take up his argument in some detail in the later section. 
But his contention that the two transitions emerged from or led to two 
very different sets of arguments appears to be only partly correct. In the 
debates on the first transition, the core issue at stake is the nature of the 
Mughal state. The older view that the Mughal rule created a centralised 
political and fiscal system (Habib 2002; Ali 2003) has been revised by 
forwarding a set of interrelated arguments. First, the Mughal state itself 
was evolving during the course of the seventeenth century, for instance, 
the growing importance of sea-borne and maritime trade; increasing 
centralization and agrarian expansion were the features of the period 
between 1650-1700. Second, certain regions such as Bengal did not see 
deeper penetration of Mughal bureaucracy, in fact, the Mughal jaghirdars 
remained dependent on local intermediaries and zamindars. Third, the 
rise of the regional centralisation that took place in the early eighteenth 
century created varied regional patterns of alliances and dependencies. 
For instance, in Bengal under Murshid Quli Khan the extent of khalisa 
land grew at the expense of the zamindars but, in the Punjab, Mughal 
nobles allied with local mercantile groups making the latter important 
subordinate allies (Alam and Subrahmanyam 2001). This strand of re-
visionism that is directly related to questioning the centrality of Mughal 
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political and economic structures and emphasising regional dynamism, 
does not necessarily see the Company rule as an extension of the ongo-
ing changes. So, it is a different topical concern within the revisionist 
literature on the eighteenth century, which validates Wilson’s point. Also, 
it is important to mention here that some of the critique of the revisionist 
writings is not based on the ‘factual’ grounds of, say, the rise of inter-
mediaries. For instance, both sides agree that despite being disproved 
by the Mughals, the number of ijaradars (revenue farmers) significantly 
grew in the eighteenth century. The dispute is on their socio-economic 
role. The increased sale of revenue farming leading to the rise of ijara-
dars led Bayly to see in them the rise of the intermediary class, for Habib 
they symbolised an instrument of oppression leading to agrarian decline. 
Rajat Datta has criticized Habib’s position that ijaradari system had ruin-
ous effects, argued on the following grounds: first, in places such as Ra-
jasthan an ijara contract was formalised not on assessed revenue (jama) 
but on the actual realized amount (hasil) of the previous five to seven 
years; second, ijara amounts fluctuated; third, ijaradars in places such as 
Mysore were held accountable to reimburse certain classes of peasants if 
the latter had fled due to the former’s oppression; fourth, Datta argues 
that there existed also in Bengal a chain of responsibilities to check ija-
radars (Datta 2003). 
Nevertheless, apart from the revision of the nature of the Mughal 
state, historians working on the early eighteenth century have also talked 
about two other key issues: trade and fiscal arrangements. It is in con-
nection with these two aspects with the concept of regional dynamism 
of the period between 1700 and the 1760s that it appears that the two 
transitions are interlinked, at least for some of the historians who build 
up their arguments along the ‘continuity’ framework. Rajat Datta in his 
work on Bengal, shows two crucial developments. First, the decline of the 
Mughal Empire did not weaken the networks of trade. In fact, the period 
underwent increased commercialisation. Second, the growing control of 
the Nawabi state over land (which was a change from the Mughal period 
as pointed out above) and the increased revenue demand did not under-
mine the commercial growth in this period (Datta 2003, 2000). In fact, 
even in the contested factional politics of Bihar and contested agrarian 
conditions, Muzaffar Alam shows that ‘consistent economic growth and 
prosperity’ took place (Alam 2003). 
There is yet again an interesting overlap or shift, whichever way one 
sees it, in the broad contours of the historiographical debate. Scholars 
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such as Sushil Chaudhury may not agree with the ‘core’ of the revision-
ist understanding that denies to see the second half of the eighteenth 
century under the Company rule as a period of sharp decline (Chaudhury 
1995), yet as Washbrook has pointed out, they too accept that the first 
half was the period of prosperity, which is a significant departure from 
the older generation of Mughal historians who saw the collapse of the 
centralized Mughal state leading to political chaos and economic decline 
(Washbrook 2001). In this regard, therefore, accounts on the economic 
history of the immediate post-Mughal phase (1700-50), at least for Ben-
gal, seems to have reached a consensual state. 
However, for historians unlike Chaudhury, who traced continuity 
in commercial and fiscal arrangements that survived the rapid political 
changes, it was important to show that the disappearance of the Mughal 
Empire neither led to the political chaos nor to a uniform economic de-
cline in the first half of the eighteenth century. It was equally important 
to show that centralisation of regional powers and emergence of portfolio 
capitalists were the strong features of the pre-colonial times. The political 
assertion of regional powers was intricately related to the rise of the new 
powerful intermediary groups that increasingly became a part of a range 
of governmental practices; the two most important being bankers who 
financed these states, and revenue farmers and other intermediaries who 
intricately became part of the political formation. It is not so much of a 
surprise to see the centrality of agrarian and commercial intermediaries 
in Bayly’s accounts, both of which crossed their ways in the formation of 
regional states. They signified a process of economic prosperity and po-
litical change. The Company closely interacted and depended on this set 
of people in its process to acquire political power: the Company needed 
them. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam and C. A. Bayly have argued, it was the 
increased role of the merchant capital in state and military finance that 
‘materially aided the rise to power’ of the Company (Subrahmanyam and 
Bayly 1988: 418). It was on their prosperity (and conflicts) that the colo-
nial state grafted itself. Ironically, it was the same class of portfolio capi-
talists who by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were ‘se-
verely limited in their prospects, and ultimately swept away’ (Ibid.: 402). 
In this scheme of analysis, the second transition is closely linked to 
the social and economic outcomes of the first transition. In other words, 
the whole ‘continuity’ paradigm that suggested to treat the Company 
state that was consolidating its political power on the back of the rich, 
prosperous and politically active socio-economic intermediary class would 
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have fallen flat had the ‘revisionist’ historians stuck to the framework of 
a universal economic decline in the aftermath of the disintegration of 
the Mughal Empire. Unlike Wilson, Alavi is alert in recognising this con-
nection; she says that the studies on regional polities that challenge the 
theory of post-Mughal ‘crisis’ are central to the analysis of the early co-
lonial state, which has been explained as ‘being shaped by the referents 
of indigenous political economies’. In fact, Wilson also comments in the 
same essay comments that ‘In a society in which “trade” and “sover-
eignty” were closely entwined, and politics was becoming rapidly com-
mercialized, explaining the English Company’s transition from merchant 
to ruler is not a difficult task.’ (Wilson 2007: 958). Wilson definitely would 
not disprove of the observation that what has now become relatively 
easier (the task of explaining this transition) has a long history of almost 
three decades of historiographical exchanges, polarizations, shifts and 
revisions. What happened when the Company turned into a ruler is still 
a highly debatable issue, as Wilson’s own review of Sudipta Sen’s work 
suggests (Wilson 2004).  
Colonial governance 
As mentioned in the introduction to this essay, the nature of colonial rule 
in the late eighteenth century has once again become a site of heated ex-
change. It has also encouraged a varied proliferation of research themes. 
Some of the older themes such as revenue extraction mechanism, pace 
of economic growth and market organisation still attract scholarly atten-
tion but not in the same way as in the 1980s. There is a slight shift per-
ceivable in the approach towards the subject. The minute socio-economic 
history of commodity trade, agrarian expansion and mercantile networks 
has given way to the study of ideas and ideologies of governance. This 
section takes up two recent works on these themes. The exclusion of 
some other recent works on the related themes of transition is purely in-
tentional to keep the thematic focus of this essay intact on the nature of 
the colonial state formation, the theme that we have been predominantly 
discussing so far. 
In understanding the ideological framework of the colonial state and 
the processes that affected its formation, one recent emphasis is on de-
lineating the balance between the metropolitan imperial influence and 
the local Indian conditions. This is the thrust of a set of questions that 
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Washbrook recently raised in his writings. He asks: 
Were ‘Indian’ and ‘European’ interests always juxtaposed? Did the 
conquest take place through the impact of a superior exogenous force 
– wholly formed and fashioned outside South Asia – on a pristine, indig-
enous and (proto-national) culture? Or were, at this time, India and Euro-
pean interests and identities deeply entangled and did the ‘conquest’ – if 
it can be so called – take place because of cleavages and conflicts within 
a common South Asian polity (or perhaps, more properly, a Euro-Asian 
one)? How far the Fstructuring of juxtaposed ‘Indian and ‘British’ identi-
ties and interests a consequence of the conquest rather than its cause? 
(Washbrook 2001: 374-75) 
Washbrook’s own answer is that the distinctive features of high impe-
rialism (based on domination and exploitation) cannot be read back into 
the eighteenth century. Despite the state’s strength in undermining the 
pluralistic and dynamic character of early eighteenth-century India, the 
colonial state’s nature was affected and influenced by the existing Indian 
conditions. For him, as Bayly had argued in his earlier works, the colonial 
break became obvious in the decades of the 1820s and 1830s. 
In the article we discussed above, Bayly deals with the same ques-
tion – that is, about the balance between metropolitan and local factors. 
According to him, two areas that made the Company state very distinct 
from indigenous polities and also characterized its expansionist nature 
were, first, a rigorous tradition of administrative accountancy, and sec-
ond, an ideology of transcendent law and sovereignty. He concludes that 
in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the Company’s personnel 
already widely subscribed to an absolute notion of the rights of their 
state and of the ‘rule of law’, which was partly derived from the metro-
politan political culture. It appears to the present reviewer that this line 
of inquiry has led the historian to revise his earlier periodization; Bayly 
says, ‘Broadly, for the period before 1765, it can be argued that the East 
India Company was one of the Indian players, but difficult to argue so for 
the period afterwards’ (Bayly 1994: 338). However, turning to the state 
formation process, he also makes it clear that the colonial state was not 
identical to the metropolitan state, and once again takes up the role of 
indigenous Indian system. The colonial state formation was also linked, 
he argues, to the nature of indigenous social and political conflicts, which 
were three in nature: 
a) clashes resulting from the decline of the central authority of the  
     Mughal Empire, 
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b) consequences of the formation of states in the periphery, and, 
c) attempts made by rulers and commercial elites to control trade 
and production. 
All these were independently taking place. In other words, the Company’s 
presence in South Asia did not ‘create’ these political and economic con-
ditions but rather got enmeshed in these conflicts that influenced its 
state formation. 
Robert Travers’ study of ideologies that led to the formation of colonial 
state goes in the same direction. He states that ‘British imperial ideology 
was formed at the intersection of exported European concepts and appro-
priated indigenous categories that were put to new uses by the colonial 
state’ (Travers 2007: 14). Situating his study between two conventional 
dates and events of colonial rule, 1757 (the battle of Plassey) as the 
starting point, and 1793 (the inception of Permanent Settlement) as the 
closing date, Travers’ study moves along London and Bengal to chart the 
complexities of different ideological frameworks such as ancient constitu-
tionalism and despotism that the colonial state struggled with.  
Let us eke out a chronological development of colonial shifting ideolo-
gies from Travers’ account. This is not to simplify the historical complexity 
of engagements that he deftly presents but to allow us to better grasp 
the broader contours of colonial state-formation as they unfolded in the 
last forty years of the eighteenth century. Against the backdrop of the 
Company’s growing financial troubles, the period from the late 1760s to 
that of the early 1780s was largely dominated by the debates on resto-
ration of Mughal constitution as a guiding framework for colonial rule. 
Mughal constitution together with its baggage of absolutism, despotism 
and tyranny on the one hand, and clarity, fixity and notion of property on 
the other, was the central debating ground in these decades. These were 
the competing understandings of the Mughal constitutionalism which, as 
P. J. Marshall has pointed out, were ‘heavily tinged with differing British 
assumptions and also reflecting the varied agendas of Indian informants’ 
(Marshall 2008: 1284). Each of the three main actors involved in this – 
Warren Hastings, Philip Francis and Edmund Burke – used the language of 
Mughal constitution but to different purposes. 
Hastings used it for two purposes: first, amidst the growing crisis and 
the inevitability of reform and greater involvement on the part of the 
Company, Hastings believed that a return to and restoration of the older 
Mughal institutions was the best way forward. Second, restoration was 
premised on the idea of an unfissured Mughal sovereignty of which the 
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Company, Hastings thought, was the direct inheritor. Pressed hard to raise 
greater revenue and introduce judicial reforms, Hastings validated his own 
understanding of sovereignty by claiming the sovereign status of the Mughal 
rulers. A key issue here was the right to private property in land. He rec-
ognized the hereditary rights of zamindars but, for him, previously the 
Mughal rulers and now the Company was the ultimate owner of the soil. 
Francis, on the other hand, did not rule out the despotic nature of the 
Mughals but, as Travers argues, ‘separated Mughal despotism from the 
taint of arbitrary power’ (Travers 2007: 218). He fiercely opposed Hast-
ings’ understanding of the nature of sovereignty. He argued that private 
property had flourished under the benevolent and moderate rule of the 
Mughal emperors. So far as opposition to Hastings was concerned, Burke 
and Francis were on the same side of the debate, but for the former the 
Mughal Empire was not a despotic regime. According to Burke, Mughal 
rule had stability, fixity and a legal basis of governance. It was on this 
point that he called Hastings’ attempt to ‘usurp’ sovereignty under the 
name of Mughal constitutionalism a ‘farce’. More so, this emphasis on 
Mughal constitutionalism was not only borne out of the Company’s local 
political involvement in India but was synchronous with the British po-
litical culture of upholding constitutionalism as the form and ideology of 
governance. Another factor was the strong element of distrust that the 
Company officials had for each other. The fact that some of the officials 
returned to England as nabobs (Robert Clive, the governor of Bengal 
before Hastings is the best example), amidst the financial insolvency of 
the Company created demand for reforms and regulation. A part of Hast-
ings’ administrative reforms were therefore arising out of the financial 
and institutional crises that the Company was facing on its own account 
(Travers 2007). 
Travers is definitely not the first scholar to point out the role of the 
Mughal constitution in the ideological formation of the colonial rule but 
he definitely goes beyond the standard accounts that show the symbolic 
value the colonial rulers put on the Mughal constitution. He shows how 
it influenced the way governance was imagined. Hastings, for instance, 
(and Francis believed the same) thought that British collectors should be 
withdrawn from the districts. They both considered country government 
to be in the hands of the natives (Ibid.: 223–24). Over a period of roughly 
twenty years (1760s and 1770s) the political dynamism, amidst some 
form of institutional continuity from the pre-colonial times, had definitely 
changed. The following two diagrams (as heuristic models) can serve to 
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understand this change. In Diagram 1, for regions such as Awadh and 
Bengal, the nawabs should have been in the centre of this configuration 
and the English East India Company a separate entity from the rest of the 
European companies (at least for the post-1757 period); the fact is that 
the Mughals did politically remain relevant, at least until 1764 (battle of 
Buxar), and also ideologically on the question of legitimacy and institu-
tional practices of governance, even afterwards.
 
 
Diagram 1: Political configuration before the Company took over
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Diagram 2: The new Political Configuration, 1760s-1780s
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Clearly, the Company worked amidst varying pull and push from dif-
ferent quarters, including its own officials whose involvement in private 
trade was partly responsible for the financial insolvency of the Com-
pany, which in turn was attracting greater regulating interference from 
the British Parliament. In this regard, some of the earlier arguments 
that the Company was just a mercantile body have been seriously re-
vised. There was an element of truth in the conventional nationalist 
critique that even in the eighteenth century the Company did represent 
the British nation; that the tie between the Company and Parliament 
was not cosmetic (the Company officials in India certainly thought that 
they were representing the British nation and empire). This tie started 
becoming more pronounced from the 1780s onwards, leading to the 
implementation of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal (1793), which 
was touted as the ‘new constitution’. As Travers shows, the language of 
Mughal constitutionalism was replaced by growing suspicion and mis-
trust of the native bureaucracy (ibid.: 205–08). ‘Native depravity’ was not 
just a cultural maxim but became crucial in shaping colonial governance. 
Why did this change happen in the 1780s? One reason was the in-
creased financial burden from the wars with Marathas and Tipu Sultan. 
Secure ways of raising revenue led to the argument that zamindars 
should be upheld with proprietary rights in land, which indeed happened 
in 1793 (ibid.: 208–210). This signified the growth of the centralized 
state, or what Wilson has described as ‘the state as machine’. The im-
perial connections and the way that India was discussed in Britain were 
once again important factors in this change during the 1780s. Travers 
shows that Burke’s speeches during Hastings’ impeachment had two 
sides: one, demand for greater imperial sovereignty; two, his political 
analysis of Indian politics based upon an elevated conception of Mughal 
constitution. Through the latter, Burke narrowed the conceptual dis-
tance between Europe and Asia, but this strand of his argument was 
also the one that was less influential (ibid. 219–223). Travers concludes 
by saying that the coming of Cornwallis to India ‘personified the new 
sense of imperial responsibility prescribed in the Pitt’s Act’ (ibid.: 212). 
This imperial responsibility meant that the Company state was ideally 
becoming ‘a rule by administrative law created in a highly authoritarian 
structure of government’ (ibid.: 244). 
Much of the arguments squeezed out from Travers textured analy-
sis also holds true for Wilson’s The Domination of Strangers (2010). 
Both regard the period of the 1770s–80s as marked by crises and 
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anxiety, which shaped the new order that started emerging in the 
1780s onwards. However, Wilson’s treatment of the period, which is 
also slightly enlarged as he carries the story forward to 1835, is also 
(at least in thematic scope) different from Travers. This difference is 
well articulated by Wilson himself in his review of Travers’ work. He 
says, 
One criticism of Ideology and Empire, then, is that it fails to ac-
count for the very radical way in which British concepts such as 
the ‘ancient constitution’, despotism or the right of conquest were 
reworked to find conceptual use in Bengal. One is left wondering 
what, precisely and practically, happens to concepts when they 
travel.2 
Wilson tries to show not only the implementation of ancient constitu-
tionalism but also of another important ideology, utilitarianism, in differ-
ent spheres of governance: property, Hindu joint family and not least the 
indigenous ‘liberal’ critique that started to take shape from the 1820s. 
There are three main arguments in The Domination of Strangers 
(Wilson 2010). First, the rise of modern colonial governance in Bengal 
was a function of colonial anxiety. The emergence of new forms of gov-
ernance occurred from the anxious, insecure attitude to Indian society. 
They did not develop from a confident desire to transform South Asia 
or impose a coherent political ideology. In other words, crises led the 
state to acquire its ‘colonial’ character. Second, this is a story of a wider 
(global) phenomenon of the rise of modern states. Third, the relation-
ship between ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’ that was based on strangeness, 
mutual suspicion and anxiety was not only limited to a narrow period of 
intensive colonial state formation but was a feature that kept reproduc-
ing itself throughout the rule. Wilson states that the ‘new constitution of 
1793 was an unsuccessful attempt to suppress those anxieties’ (ibid.: 47). 
Wilson’s book has received wide and detailed engagement, and this 
review will not reproduce the arguments already raised in these writings 
but rather will stick to the nature of colonial state-formation and the ways 
in which Wilson presents it.3 Taking Travers’ and Wilson’s books together, 
it definitely becomes clear that the 1780s formed a turning point in the 
history of colonial state-formation. Whether that formation crystallized 
into a confident bureaucratic structure of state – or remained ridden with 
anxiety – is a different matter. Like Travers, Wilson also traces the impe-
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tus of this change in the financial and political situation of the early 1780s 
that signalled the demise of the debate on the ‘ancient constitution’. The 
two standard reasons behind this change, he says, were first, the military-
fiscal crisis and, second, the influence of British ideas. However, according 
to Wilson, these are not adequate and therefore need to be supplemented 
by two more conjectural factors: first, the part of the dynamics of British 
politics that lent significance on ‘property’ as a rallying point in political 
life; second, the changing structure of the Company service and officers’ 
attitude towards life in India (Wilson 2010: 54 f.). The issue of property 
– the debate over the ‘ancient’ rights of zamindars over lands as well as 
their relation with the state – has already been commented upon. 
The most interesting point in Wilson’s book (according to the present 
reviewer) concerns the second of the points mentioned above, which 
is about the changing attitude of the British in India. Here he argues 
that loneliness and feeling of strangeness became the dominant ways in 
which they saw themselves positioned in Indian society. An emotional 
gap, uneasiness and, in fact, an inability to connect with the ruled drove 
them more and more away from the participatory model of govern-
ance (which Hastings tried to follow) towards reliance on codified texts 
and abstracted rules. This was becoming a general feature amongst a 
bunch of officials posted in the ‘interiors’ of the country presiding over 
revenue and judicial matters. One of the reasons why a distant form 
of sovereignty developed during Cornwallis’ times was because he was 
interacting with these officials (ibid.: 58–9). The lack of sentiment and 
affection also resulted in increasing disdain towards native informants.
It is interesting to note that, for the period when scholars from 
within the revisionist historiography (and otherwise) have suggested a 
relatively greater amount of dialogue and exchange between Europeans 
and natives in the formation of colonial knowledge (Bayly 1996), Wilson 
regards aloofness and lonely life as factors creating distance and lack 
of social communication. One can also argue here that loneliness and 
strangeness did not in any causal way lead to the lack of social commu-
nication. The same stock of strangeness that according to Wilson drove 
the officials towards ‘textual’ engagement could also be seen to be re-
sponsible for promoting administrative duties such as interior touring 
and personal pursuits, which were often marked by social communica-
tion. This, however, is a minor point. 
In this changed context, when the ideological framework of the an-
cient or Mughal constitution collapsed under this new feeling of strange-
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ness, Wilson argues that the latter drew its ideological support from the 
idea of despotism (Wilson 2010: 63–69). We have noted above how 
the Mughal constitutionalism was variously used by Hastings, Francis 
and Burke. This new use of despotism by the officials in the 1780s–90s 
was however not utilised to explain a political culture but the ‘personal-
ity of Indians’ (ibid.: 64), which justified the ‘new constitution’ based 
on codes and abstractions. The discussion on the different usages of 
despotism is illuminating. It once again shows how a same ideological 
apparatus was not only differently used by different people but also ac-
quired new meanings at different points of time. At this point the read-
ers might feel to know a little more than what the author has offered: 
of all the existing ideological frameworks, why did ‘despotism’ become 
the chosen one? The difficulty in answering this question is evident, as 
Wilson accepts that it is ‘difficult to distinguish cause from effect’ (ibid.: 
67); that is, was the use of despotism an effect of the growing strange-
ness or a cause of it? So is the difficulty in actually locating the grounds 
that produced strangeness. He says: ‘This anxious mood seems to have 
been the product of a range of contingent forces that are hard to disen-
tangle from one another’ (ibid.). 
Within this set of factors, Wilson makes an interesting argument 
about the notion of ‘home’ while being away in a ‘colony’. He argues 
that in the 1760s and 1770s, India offered a way to earn more money, 
rank and prestige in British society on one’s return, but by the 1780s 
this had changed. ‘Officers’, he says, ‘rarely went to India with a sense 
of adventure or opportunity, more likely resigning themselves to a tedi-
ous and uncomfortable 20 years in the Indian countryside […]’ (ibid.). 
One can dig a lot of contrasting evidences from the archives of private 
letters, memoirs and diaries to suggest that, until the 1810s–20s, India 
as a colonial prize that could aid personal monetary fortune lingered 
deep in the ideas of the British families sending their sons to India. True, 
some showed great disappointment when they arrived in India but this 
is a different argument than saying that these young officers (usually 
fifteen to eighteen years old) did not see India as an opportunity. A 
more pronounced change in the attitude starts surfacing in the period of 
utilitarian reforms (under Governor-General Bentinck) of financial con-
trol over expenditure.  
As far as the specificities of the 1780s in the colonial state forma-
tion are concerned, none of the remarks challenge the core of Wilson’s 
argument, which is that ‘Cornwallis and his colleagues believed that 
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experience of intellectual engagement with Indian could not be used to 
frame British rule’ (ibid.: 73). This signified the starting point of a state 
based on abstracted laws. The success and limitation of this abstrac-
tion, the criss-cross of a mix of ideological and practical factors shaping 
those abstractions, and the native response to them is the subject of the 
remaining chapters of his book, which this review will not take into ac-
count. The debate on the eighteenth-century transition is marred by po-
lemical and rhetorical charges, and if not for anything else but to keep 
that spirit alive, it would not be so ill-humoured to end this review by 
making one such comment. If strangeness and anxiety kept the colonial 
rule going for a little less than 200 years, one wonders what a confident 
and strong state would have done. If anxious encounters were capable 
of constantly forcing the colonial state to think anew in preserving and 
developing its strategies of rule based on the growing separation from 
the ruled society, then the degree of abstraction of social and political 
practices and violence that a confident colonial state would have in-
flicted is difficult to imagine. However, perhaps no modern state is so 
powerful or confident ever to attain such a degree of alienation. The 
development of the colonial state in India was part of the rise of modern 
states elsewhere; this is what Wilson puts forward. Are we then seeing 
the flourishing of two reverse but complementary currents of history 
writing on this period: in the 1990s, C.A. Bayly made an important call 
to return the British to South Asia; the recent intervention (read Wilson) 
proposes to put South Asia on a global eighteenth-century map.  
Endnotes
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